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1. Introduction
We give an account of the basic determinants of the courses of computation of an Infinite Time Turing machine (ITTM),
a model of computation which allows for transfinitely many steps of computation. One such basic theorem relates the
ordinal codes capable of being output on halting computations to those capable of being produced eventually by some non-
terminating computation. This so-called ‘‘λ-ζ -Σ ’’-theorem is reproven here, and it is newly related to a theoremof Friedman
& Harrington on the levels of the Gödel Constructible hierarchy of sets.
In a second part we provide further new results: (i) a Normal Form Theorem (corresponding to Kleene’s Normal Form
Theorem for standard Turing machines) in which a code for a course of computation can be produced, uniformly on all
inputs, in the lengths of time close to that of the original computation; (ii) a characterization of which ordinals start gaps
in the class of ordinal halting times; (iii) an example of divergence between halting points of one-tape and three-tape ITTM
architecture answering a question of Hamkins and Seabold [12].
Prerequisites
The reader will be assumed to be familiar with the paper of Hamkins and Lewis [10] (although we have outlined most of
the basic notions above). They will need some knowledge of ordinal numbers for which see, e.g. [6], and some of the Gödel
hierarchy of constructible sets L for which [5], or the early parts of [4] can be consulted. For notions associatedwith standard
Turing Machine theory, such as recursive ordinal, Turing degree, etc. then see [26] or [24]. For the theory of admissible sets
and ordinals, vide [1].
Structure of the paper
Section 1.1 provides the general setting for the Infinite Time Turing Machines (ITTM’s) concept. This is a general
introduction serving as a less specialised motivation for the specialised results that follow. Section 1.2 relates the ITTM
context to that of other work: to Kleene’s work on an equational calculus for computation in higher types, and to higher
type recursion theory generally. Wemention that the degree theory on the integers that emerges from ITTM theory is more
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similar to that of hyperdegrees or ∆12-degrees than Turing degrees. We mention other connections to circular definitions
coming from the Gupta–Belnap revision theory. We finally indicate some points of connection with ordinal analysis in proof
theory.
In Section 1.3 we summarise the contents of Section 2 and the new results of this paper. The reader familiar with ITTM-
lehre may wish to go straight there to learn the precise statements of what is appearing here.
1.1. The General Context
Infinite Time Turing Machines (ITTM’s) are a model of discrete computation based on the standard Turing machine, but
where the ‘‘time’’ or stages of computation are allowed to transcend the finite. They were invented by Hamkins and Kidder
in the 90’s but first appeared in print in a paper authored byHamkins and Lewis [10] in 2000. For a detailed description of the
machine the reader is urged to consult that paper. We shall be assuming the reader has done so in order to fully understand
this paper, but nevertheless we give a brief account here: the hardware of such amachine is that of a standard one-way tape
of a strip of cells numbered 〈Ci|i ∈ N〉; a read/write head moves in each stage one cell to the left or right (unless it is viewing
C0 in which case it may of course only move to C1) upon reading and possibly changing the cell symbol, which we shall
restrict here to being from an alphabet consisting of ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’. (This symbol, in cell Ci say, will be called the cell value, and
if the cell value at time α is j ∈ {0, 1}we shall set Ci(α) = j.) The software remains the standard Turing machine program, as
given for example, by a transition table. The definition of [10] introduces a new state symbol qL to add to the usual finitely
many states. This symbol acts simply as one new kind of state, the limit state.
The novelty is in defining a behaviour for themachine after it has possibly been through stages for every finite time n. We
consider stages of ‘‘time’’ to be given by ordinal numbers α. This is done by fiat: at time α the head is inspecting a cell, in a
certain state and its action is entirely determined by the transition table — in short it behaves literally as a standard Turing
machine. However, at time µwhere µ is a limit ordinalwemust specify its action which we do as follows: the head returns
to the starting cell C0, the machine enters state qL; lastly we specify the cell values at limit time µ, Ci(µ), by setting
Ci(µ) =df lim inf〈Ci(α) | α < µ〉 =
⋃
α<µ
⋂
α<β<µ
Cβ(i).
To paraphrase: if the cell value stabilizes by stageµ then the value Ci(µ) at that time is that stabilized value. Otherwise it
is set to 0. (On the right equality we are using the convention that the ordinals are the von Neumann ordinals, in particular
that 0 =df ∅ and 1 =df {0}.)
Variants on this straightforward model are possible: one may specify that the value of a cell is blank at a limit time µ,
whenever the cell value had changed value unboundedly in the time µ (and thus have an alphabet of three symbols); one
may dispense with the special state qL for limit stages µ, and demand that the machine enter into the state qi where i is the
liminf of the state numbers of qj at times less than µ (this has the attractive computational feature of putting the machine,
at limit stages of time, at the beginning of the outermost loop it was cycling through before µ). Finally, and this we shall
adopt for this paper, just as the authors of [10] originally did, we allow for multiple tapes. We shall allow for three tapes
input, scratch, and output arranged side by side, with the the read/write head viewing a triple of cells, one from each tape,
simultaneously, and allowed to write likewise to all three such cells, again simultaneously, in a single step. (It is one of the
differences between such 1 tape and 3 tape models that we shall investigate in this paper.) We continue to enumerate the
cells in the same way however as 〈Ci|i ∈ N〉.
It is quite natural then to ask ‘‘towhat extent do properties of the standard Turingmachinemodel transfer to the ITTMmodel?’’.
The first obvious feature is that ITTM’s not only subsume standard TM’s in terms of the times they are allowed, they are
in essence computing at a higher type: they can read and write infinite strings of 0’s and 1’s which we consider as elements
of Cantor space 2N. We identify such x, y ∈ 2N with real numbers. (If we wish to compute simply on integer input, we can
code an integer n of course on the input tape as a 1 entered into the first n cells of the input tape, and 0’s in the others.) As
the programs (or transition tables etc. ) are still clearly enumerable we let Pe be the e’th program. If this program halts on
input x (and with y on the output tape), we write Pe(x) ↓ (or Pe(x) ↓ y).
Entirely appropriate questions are:
Question 1. What is:
(a) {e | Pe(0) ↓};
(b) {〈e, x〉 | Pe(x) ↓};
(c) {y ∈ 2N | Pe(x) ↓ y} ?
Question 1(a) and (b) here are versions of the halting problem for such machines, (a) of course is just (b) restricted to the
bottom type of integer inputs. Here (c) raises the question of what reals can be computed by such machines.
Definition 2 ([10]). A real y ∈ 2N is called writable if ∃ePe(0) ↓ y. We say that an ordinal number α (or a set A) is writable
if a code for α, or A, is writable.
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(By a code for α we mean a y ∈ 2N so that if we set n <y m ↔ y(〈n,m)〉 = 1 then 〈ω,<y〉 ∼= 〈α,<〉; in this case we
write ‘‘‖y‖ = α’’. A code for a transitive set A is any z ∈ N× N so that 〈N, z〉 ∼= 〈A,∈〉.) Clearly only countable ordinals and
countable sets in the above sense can be writable. We let WO stand for the set of reals that code wellorderings. We may ask
then:
Question 3. What are the writable reals? What are the writable ordinals?
Definition 4 ([10]). (i) We define λ =df sup{α | α is a writable ordinal} and
(ii) H(λ) = {A | A is a writable set}.
It is easy to see that if α is writable, then so is any β < α. (If y codes α then for some n ||y  n‖| = β , where y  n gives
value 1 only to those pairs 〈k,m〉where k <y m <y n; we then modify the program that outputs y to output y  n instead.)
The writable ordinals thus form an initial segment of the countable ordinals, and λ ⊆ H(λ). It can also be shown that H(λ)
is a transitive class of sets.
Considering further the computational process, we may next consider the halting times of computations Pe(x) ↓ y.
Hamkins and Lewis partly analysed such halting times on integer inputs. They defined:
Definition 5 ([10, Section 3]). (i) An ordinal α is clockable if for some e Pe(0) ↓α , where the latter indicated that the
computation halted in exactly α steps, that is its action at time α is to go into a halting state.
(ii) We define γ =df sup{α | α is clockable}.
Hamkins and Lewis proved in [10] two basic facts: (Thm 3.4) that not all ordinals below γ are clockable; (Thm 3.8) that
λ ≤ γ .
Question 6. What are the clockable ordinals? Does λ = γ ? That is, are all clockables writable?
Hamkins and Lewis pursued the Turingmachinemodel by analysing appropriate notions of ITTM-degree corresponding to
Turing degrees, and provided a wealth of results. It is the view (with the benefit of hindsight!) taken here that the emphasis
is better placed on looking not at halting computations and their outputs, but by analysing what is the essential feature of
thesemachines: that any computation stabilizes (we can regard a halting computation as a ‘degenerate’ case of stabilization).
Let us make the following definition:
Definition 7. Let S(α) = 〈Ci(α)|i ∈ N〉 be the sequence of cell values at time α; let us call the snapshot of the computation
Pe(x) at time α to be the sequence S(α) together with any other appropriate specificatory information, such as the current
position of the head, and the current line of the transition table.
As there are only continuummany possible snapshots of any given computation, we see that as α increases through the
ordinals theremust be some stage ξ so that a snapshot S(ξ) reappears at some later stage, and indeed the computationmust
at some stage enter an infinite repeating loop. Indeed, for some computations of the form Pe(x) although themachine has not
formally halted, the contents y of the output tape remain unaltered from some point on (‘‘the output tape has stabilized’’).
Such a real y is, in a very concrete sense, ‘‘eventually computable’’. Hamkins and Lewis’s term for this was eventually writable.
Definition 8 ([10, Section 3]). (i) If there is some point in time δ so that for all later δ′ the content of the output tape of
Pe(0) is fixed with content y ∈ 2N (‘‘Pe(0) ↑ y’’) we say that y is eventually writable.
(ii) For the least such δ occurring in (i) (if it exists), we shall write Pe(0) ↑δ y.
(iii) We define ζ =df sup{β | β has an eventually writable code}.
(iv) H(ζ ) is the class of sets Awith eventually writable code.
Again, any ζ ′ < ζ has eventually writable code, and H(ζ ) is a transitive class of sets. We may then ask:
Question 9. What are ζ and H(ζ )?
An important point to note is that any computation that starts to cycle will in fact do so after a countable number of stages
(a simple Löwenheim–Skolem argument shows this, or it can be done directly (see [10, Thm 1.1])). The ordinal ζ (and the
set H(ζ )) are thus necessarily countable.
Lastly we define a third class of sets: those whose code appears on the output tape of some computation, although such
appearance may be evanescent:
Definition 10 ([10, Section 3]). (i) A real y ∈ 2N is accidentally writable if there is some e so that y appears on one of the
computation tapes of Pe(0) at some point in time.
(ii) We defineΣ =df sup{β | β has an accidentally writable code}.
(iii) Furthermore, H(Σ) is the class of sets with accidentally writable codes.
There is the obvious version ofQuestion 9 forΣ and for accidentallywritable sets. In the papers [31] and [32]we answered
the above questions Questions 1, 3, 6 and 9 (and Question 12). The first paper [32] was primarily motivated with answering
the ‘‘clockables=writables?’’ query, and missed out on the fundamental relationship (that we called the λ-ζ -Σ-Theorem),
which was published in [31]. We take the opportunity here in the first part of the paper to give a cleaner account of these
arguments and recast the above theorem.We shall also use this to give a machine–theoretic proof of a theorem of Friedman
and Harrington.
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Definition 11. (i) A set x ⊆ N is said to be decidable iff there is some e ∈ N so that ∀n ∈ N Pe(n) ↓ and ∀n(n ∈ x ↔
Pe(n) ↓ 1).
(ii) A set A ⊆ 2N is said to be decidable iff there is some e ∈ N so that ∀x ∈ 2NPe(x) ↓ and ∀x ∈ 2N(x ∈ A↔ Pe(x) ↓ 1).
We then may ask:
Question 12. What are the ITTM decidable sets of integers, or reals?
1.2. Relationships to other work
In the immediate ITTM neighbourhood, we have indicated the pioneering paper of Hamkins and Lewis [10] where all the
basic architecture, definitions, and results are stated. The same authors pursue the Turing machine analogy in [11] where
they investigate Post’s problem for both integer and real computation using ITTM’s. Hamkins and Seabold looked at the single
tape model in [12] as alluded to, and for most purposes their results show that the 1 tape model is sufficient to replace the
3 tape model.
It is one of our themes that proper comparison of ITTM degree and computational structure should not be that with
ordinary standard Turing degrees, but with that obtained from generalized recursion theory or higher type recursion theory.
We have pursued this analogy in [30] (the former appearing, by the vagaries of the publication processes even before [10]!)
and [33]. It is our view that ITTM’s provide amodel of computation that is stronger than that of Kleene’s Recursion (see [17]).
However, the resulting degree structure is more akin to that of hyperdegrees or even ∆12-degrees. (Hamkins and Lewis’s
negative result to Post’s problem in ITTM theory, as opposed to Post’s positive solution for standard Turing degrees, points
in this direction, and the results on complete sets in degrees of the ITTM jump hierarchy being recursively isomorphic to codes
of levels of the Gödel hierarchy in [31] confirm this.) In order to view ITTM’s as providing amodel of recursion however, one
needs the λ-ζ -Σ-Theorem characterisation of the relevant ordinals, and then at that point one can obtain a ‘‘Normal Form
Theorem’’ (Corollary 35). This then links ITTM theory qua a recursion theory with the generalised theory of Spector classes
in Higher Type Recursion Theory. Further discussion of this would take us too far afield.
Whatever one’s view on the connection with higher recursion theory, one does seem to need to analyse the theory at a
more abstract level (meaning not at the level of machine programs) and see the connections with lower level set theory,
mainly that of the constructible sets, and in particular with that of theory of admissible sets (see [1]). Kripke and Platek
formulated the theory KP which is a weakening of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms of set theory so that, in brief, we have
instances of∆1-Separation andΣ1-Replacement (meaning that the relevant schemes are restricted to apply to formulae in
the mentioned classes). Models of KP are then called admissible sets.
As Kleene Recursion is tied up intimately with a higher type recursion at the level of such sets (see for example [16]), so
ITTM Recursion is tied up with models of an enhanced theory of KP (namelyΣ2-KP obtained by enhancing the Replacement
scheme to require Σ2-Replacement) which enjoy an extendibility property (namely that between Lζ and LΣ ). Just as the
higher type Kleene Recursion is at the level of admissible sets, so our contention is that ITTM computation on sets of reals, is
at the level of ‘‘Σ2-extendible sets’’. However, we have to make use of these sets even when analysing computation on sets
of integers, i.e. at one type down.
This particular ‘‘liminf’’ inductive constructive has its parallels in other areas. (1) Löwe was the first to point out the
similarities of the ITTM computation sequenceswith certain so-called revision sequences in the theory of truth of Herzberger.
This was pursued in [21,22]. In fact we now see that formally these structures are mutually interpretable: any computation
can be coded into a revision sequence, so that the eventual output/tape values, etc. are recursive in the stability set of a
Herzberger revision sequence. (2) Kreutzer [20] used essentially a revision rule akin to Herzberger’s when defining a new
partial fixed point semantics. (3) Burgess [2] abstracted fromHerzbergerian revision semantics the notion of a (arithmetically)
quasi-inductive definition. This is the mathematical analogue appropriate to procedures involving infinitary liminf rules, of
(monotone) inductive definitions (and operators). Questions then relating to one area from ITTM’s, revision sequences, and
quasi-inductive definitions have their formal equivalents in either of the the other two. One question of foundational interest
is: ‘‘How much of analysis is needed to show that ITTM computations halt or enter a loop?’’ One can formulate this as a
statement of second order number theory, and it can be shown that this is provable inΠ13 -CA0 but notΠ
1
2 -CA0 (see Simpson
[28] for the relevant notions here).
There are connections with ordinal analysis is proof theory. Rathjen [25] has given an ordinal analysis ofΠ12 -CA0 which is
tied upwith analysing chains ofΣ1 extendible levels of the L-hierarchy. Thepresumedordinal analysis ofΠ13 -CA0will involve
chains ofΣ2 extendibles in the L-hierarchy. Analysis of computability on integers here involves statements concerning the
first link in such a chain (see Theorem 30).
Lastly there is the question of what these virtual machines are ‘‘good for’’. One aspect is that, as Hamkins and Lewis say
in their introduction, is that the machines have a defined behaviours at limit stages: we do not have to agonize over any
physically imposed constraints or configurations. We may then think of ITTM’s as a mathematical laboratory for analysing
other modes of infinitary or transfinite computational model making. For example, the purely physical models of Hogarth
[13,14], and Etesi-Németi [7] concerning possible levels of computation in various spacetimes can be simulated on ITTM’s.
Insights gained from the ‘‘conceptual’’ ITTM models can be used to feed back to those putative physical models. (It turns
out that the Hogarth models can be considerably ‘‘amplified" see [29]. One should perhaps not make too much of this, since
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ITTM’s are themselves subject to a particular infinitary rule at limit times, that might conceivably not be compatible with
some yet-to-be-devised physical models. However, in general the physical GR-models are in the case of Etesi-Németi, at the
level of ∆02 or ‘‘trial and error predicates’’ and can be modelled just on an ITTM with just a single limit point in time; the
Hogarth model of [14] decides arithmetical statements, and these can be done in ω2 many steps on an ITTM and hence in
an arrangement using just infinitely many limit points — or as Hogarth does — an ω-sequence of standard Turing machines
in a particular space–time arrangement that allows appropriate communication between the devices. The ‘‘amplification’’
referred to above, is to see that Hogarth’s set-up can sustain hyperarithmetical queries, and thus can be simulated on an ITTM
working through the recursive ordinals. One could go further, but the physical interpretation starts to stretch incredulity (if
it has not done so already!). We do not investigate these matters further here.)
1.3. A detailed outline and a description of new results
Section 2 continues with some basic definitions and facts mostly taken from [10]. We then proceed to look at cell
stabilization times Lemma 22. That the height of the ordinals ζ ,Σ gives the first repeating snapshots in the universal
machine program is established in Lemma 23. The main theorem characterising in terms of the notion of Σ2-extendibility
of levels of the L-hierarchy, is Theorem 30.
The statement connecting all of λ, ζ ,Σ is at Corollary 32 of the main Theorem 1, and the ‘‘clockables are writable’’
question is answered at Corollary 33. From thiswe can derive theNormal Form Theorem for ITTM computation (Corollary 35),
by way of analogy with Kleene’s Normal Form Theorem for Turing computation, see e.g. [26, Section 14 Thm III] or more
precisely [18, Section 53 Theorem IX]. The last three theorems of this section are cited from other work to illustrate the
relations with degree theories such as hyperdegrees, as they establish Spector criteria for the degree orderings (see [26,
Section 16, Corollary XXXVI] or [27, II.Theorem 7.6]). This indicates the nature of the ITTM degrees on sets of integers.
Sy Friedman asked, given the relationship between ITTM’s and Gödel’s L-hierarchy (as embodied in the λ-ζ -Σ-Theorem,
Corollary 32), whether the ITTM viewpoint enabled any new proofs about the lower end of this hierarchy. (This hierarchy is
so well studied that one could not expect that there be new set theoretical results, but new proofs or insights could perhaps
be obtained). In Section 2, we give what could perhaps be called a purely ‘‘machine–theoretic’’ proof of a theorem of his
and Harrington, where they in turn answered a question of Richter. Richter’s question was whether the first two levels of
the L hierarchy with the same Σ2-theories (meaning the same set Σ2-sentences in the language of set theory were true at
both levels) was also the first pair with this Σ2-extendibility property. Friedman and Harrington answered affirmatively,
and although one might automatically expect that the answer be positive, it required some argument. Friedman’s original
proof involved fine structural considerations and utilised an argument showing that in this region of the L-hierarchy one has
uniformΣ2-skolem functions (see [8]). For us the argument drops out of the fact that between S(ζ ) and S(Σ), the snapshots
of the universal machine are those of a permanently looping cycle (in tandem with the fact that codes for levels of the Lα-
hierarchy are accidentally writable for levels α < Σ). This is at Lemma 47. We let the reader decide what new insight this
gives, if any, on the Friedman–Harrington result.
In the second part of this paper (Sections 3 and 4) we consider a number of open questions. In Section 3 we answer:
Question 13. If Pe(0) ↓α then how fast can one write down a code for α itself?
We show (Lemma 48) that if α is a halting time of a program, then in fact there is another program that halts in time
≤ α with a real code y ∈ WO on its output tape with ||y|| = α. This allows us to claim that in the Normal Form Theorem
(Corollary 35) we may always find a code for a course of a computation very close to the same time as the length of the
original computation (uniformly on all inputs). A more precise form of this is stated at Theorem 49.
We characterise those ordinals that initiate gaps in the clockable ordinals. Hamkins and Lewis had shown that if α is
admissible then no computation Pe(n) halts in precisely α steps, and admissible α either start gaps in the halting times of
such computations, or are already interior to one. The converse question arises:
Question 14. If α starts a gap in the clockable ordinals, is it admissible?
We answer affirmatively at Theorem 50.
In Section 4 we discuss some differences between the ‘standard’ 3 tape machine of [10] and a 1 tape machine of [12].
The class of computable functions f : 2N −→ N is identical for both models, but there are slight differences if one wishes to
consider functions f : 2N −→ 2N. As Hamkins and Seabold demonstrated, this arises just out of small technicality: a final
stage of simulating a 3 tape computation of a function f : 2N −→ 2N on a 1 tape machine cannot halt without an additional
piece of, either hardware (an extra reserved cell, or extra piece of information stored in the r/w head)) or changing the
alphabet (a 3 symbol alphabet allows the storage of a bit more information). In discussing the 1 tape machine Hamkins
and Seabold again looked at halting times of such machines; one expects some vagaries of difference here between the two
models. They cataloguedmany halting times, but left openwhether any halting time of a 3 tapemachinewhichwas a simple
limit ordinal could be the halting time of a 1 tape machine. We give a counterexample to this suggestion, Theorem 52, by
showing that if α is the least Π3-reflecting ordinal then α + ω is the halting time of a 3 tape machine but not of a 1 tape
version.
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2. The basic λ-ζ-Σ relation
We start our investigation of this relationship by first listing some basic facts of the ITTM concept.Facts 15, 16, 18 and 19
are due to Hamkins and Lewis and are in [10]:
Fact 15 ([10, Corollary 2.3]). AnyΠ11 predicate of reals is decidable by some Pe: meaning that if A ∈ Π11 then there is e ∈ ω
so that ∀x[Pe(x) ↓ ∧ (x ∈ A←→ Pε(x) ↓ 1)].
Hence, it is possible, given a standard method for coding hereditarily countable sets, for a machine to verify if y ∈ 2N is
such a code.
It is an exercise in dovetailing (see [34] and the argument at (1) of Theorem 52) to see that there is an algorithm so that
if B ∈ 2N is written on the input tape (equivalently the scratch tape) portion then after ω many steps the characteristic
function of the complete ΣB2 set is written on the output tape (meaning that k ∈ B′′ iff the k’th cell on the output tape
contains a 1). This operation B −→ B′′ is characteristic of such machines.
Fact 16. We have λ < ζ < Σ , and H(λ), H(ζ ) are transitive admissible sets which are unions of such. (cf. [10, 8.1,8.2,8.5 &
8.6]). The ordinals λ and ζ are highly closed: they are admissible limits of admissibles (and more).
There is a universal machineUwhich we often consider as running simultaneously all the computations Pe(0) for e ∈ ω.
We organise this of course by dividing up the scratch and output tapes ofU recursively into infinitely many other virtual
‘tapes’.
Definition 17 (cf. [10, Proof of 8.6]). We let σ(ν) denote the ‘‘grand sum’’ function that adds together all the ordinals that
are coded onU’s ‘tapes’ at time ν.
We may thus think of σ(ν) as a temporary ‘approximation’ toΣ , but not in any sense that it is monotonically increasing
to that limit: once ν > ζ then σ(ν) remains in the interval (ζ ,Σ) in an oscillatory fashion. It is easy to see also that (by the
same reasons for Fact 16):
Fact 18. The set H(Σ) is transitive.
Although it turns out not to be admissible ([32, Cor 3.4]). In [10] it is shown that if one has a real y ∈ WO which is
code for the ordinal α on a tape then it is easy to arrange a computation that computes, by iterating the definition of the
constructible Lγ -hierarchy along the ordering coded by y, a code for Lα . (This is also done in detail in [9].) This construction
proceeds formally by an induction along y and can be done inside any sufficiently closed set containing the real y. Very weak
closure conditions are needed for this. Closure under the rudimentary functions (see [4]) suffices here. As Fact 16 asserts
that H(λ) and H(ζ ) are unions of admissible sets (and are ‘sufficiently closed’ in the above sense), it is then straightforward
to see that:
Fact 19 ([10, Theorem 8.6]). We have Lλ ⊆ H(λ) and Lζ ⊆ H(ζ ).
We may thus view the above as saying that the machines are also capable of producing codes for initial segments of the
L-hierarchy, at least up to ζ .
However, an easy argument shows that:
Fact 20 (cf. [32, 3.4]). The ordinalΣ is either admissible or a union of such; further LΣ ⊆ H(Σ).
Proof. We give the argument in this case as we shall build on it in the sequel. We may consider variations on a universal
machine U that pause automatically at fixed intervals of time and given any accidentally writable y ∈ 2N appearing on
some ‘tape’ of U at such a stage, it initiates simulations of the standard Turing machines to compute the ranks ‖{e}y‖ for
those e ∈ ω, so that {e}y ∈ WO. (It is unproblematic for a machine to check the Π11 -question as to whether {e}y ∈ WO by
Hamkins and Lewis’ result [10, 2.3] mentioned at Fact 15). Hence, if y ∈ H(Σ) then so are all the ordinals of the form ‖{e}y‖,
and then so all sets of the form L||e||y [y], from which the Fact follows. 
However, it is readily seen that the ITTM construction and processes are highly absolute. Thus, any computation Pe(0)
for example can be performed inside any rudimentary closed setM, and the computation sequence is seen to be absolute
for as many stages as there are ordinals inM. Thus:
Fact 21 ([32, 3.3 & 3.5]). We have Lλ ⊇ H(λ), Lζ ⊇ H(ζ ), and LΣ ⊇ H(Σ), and thus with Facts 19 and 20 we have equality
as well.
However, at this stage we have not identified these ordinals in any way, nor have we any hold as to what the ITTM-
decidable sets of integers may be.
It is a small but important point to note that one may have identical snapshots at different points in time ν < ν ′ (or even
at points νn < νn+1 for n < ω) without the computation being in a final infinite loop (perhaps Ci(νn) = 1 = Ci(νn+1), but
for some νn < ξn < νn+1 wemay have Ci(ξn) = 0; if ν˜ = supn{νn}we shall have Ci(˜ν) = 0). To get a permanently repeating
loop in the snapshot sequence one needs to know the above scenario is not occurring: one needs to know that there are
no such ξn times as in the example given: then we know there are no switches in value and any limit point snapshot of an
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apparent looping sequence really is a final, repeating loop. Such snapshots then reappear on a closed and unbounded class
of ordinal stages.
We now prove a lemma on the stabilization points of cells Ci during a computation Pe(0). We make the following defini-
tion:
δi(σ ) ' inf{δ < σ |∀δ′ ∈ [δ, σ ) Ci(δ′) = Ci(δ) } if the latter set is non-empty; otherwise δi(σ ) is undefined.
Thus, δi(σ ) < σ when it is defined.
Lemma 22. Let Pe(0) be any program, and let the cell values be Ci(ν) at time ν . Then Ci(Σ) = Ci(ζ ) for any i < ω. In particular:
Either δi(ζ ), δi(Σ) are both defined and equal, or they are both undefined.
Proof. We let Pf (0) be the program that (i) computes ‘grand sum’ ordinals σ(ν) as above; (ii) calculates δi(σ (ν)), by
simulating a run of Pe(0) and looking at cell values in that run. (iii) it then writes the value of δi(σ (ν)) (if it is defined)
to a reserved area of tape, R1, but only after inspecting the current contents of R1, and if that contents codes an ordinal δ1
say, it checks that δ1 < δi(σ (ν)). Thus, if δ1 is not a smaller ordinal than δi(σ (ν)), for whatever reason, then δ1 is left on R1,
unchanged. Otherwise the code to hand for δi(σ (ν)) replaces that for δ1 on R1. If now ∃ν ′ < Σ∀ν ∈ (ν ′,Σ)Ci(ν ′) = Ci(ν),
that is, if δi(Σ) is defined (and so is < Σ) once σ(ν) > ν ′ a code for an ordinal ν0 ≥ ν ′ ≥ δi(σ (ν)) will be present on the
segment R1 at the end of this stage, never to be overwritten. Thus, ν0 is eventually writable, and so ν0 < ζ . We deduce that
δi(Σ) ≤ ν0 < ζ . However, it is now obvious that δi(ζ ) is defined and must equal δi(Σ).
Now suppose that δi(ζ ) is defined. Let Pg be any program that eventually has a code for the eventually writable ordinal
δi(ζ ) on its output tape. Suppose at time σ(ν) Pg has on its output tape a code for δν . Let Pf ′ be the following modification
of the above program Pf : a further task (iv) is added: on calculating δi(σ (ν)) if it sees it must write this as a new ordinal
code to R1, it additionally writes to R2, say, a code for the least ξ ∈ (δν, δi(σ (ν)) where Ci changed value (if such exists);
otherwise it does nothing. Now at stage (iv), if we suppose σ(ν) sufficiently large so that a code for the eventual value δi(ζ )
is present on Pg for all times later than ν, and then an ordinal code is written on R2, it would stay permanently there: it is
thus eventually writable. However, that contradicts the definition of δi(ζ )! Hence, Ci cannot change value throughout the
interval (δi(ζ ),Σ).
Finally, note that if one (equivalently both) of δi(ζ ), δi(Σ) is undefined, then Ci(ζ ) = Ci(Σ) = 0 by the liminf rule on
cell values. 
If we let Pe be the program of the universal machine U we see that U thus has repeating snapshot sequences SU(ν)
for ν = ζ and Σ . The above argument (forU now rather than Pe) shows that no cell stabilized at ζ changes value for the
universal machine in (ζ ,Σ). Further, the cells stabilized at Σ are then precisely those stabilized at ζ : all other cells then
have value 0 at both these times by the liminf rule.
We thus have shown the first part of (i) of the next lemma. The second part of (i) (which we have also just established)
merely emphasises this point: we do have a permanently repeating loop: the ‘‘snapshot sequence’’ 〈SU(τ )|ζ ≤ τ < Σ〉 is
destined to repeat exactly with SUΣ .µ+τ = SUζ+τ for any τ < Σ . It thus has periodicityΣ − ζ = Σ .
Lemma 23. (i) We have SU(ζ ) = SU(Σ). Additionally for every i, CUi stable atΣ implies CUi does not change value in (ζ ,Σ).
(ii) Moreover, (ζ ,Σ) is the lexicographically least pair of ordinals satisfying (i).
Proof. We are only left with observing (ii). If (z, s) were a lexicographically lesser pair, we could write a program that,
simulating U, searches for such a pair, and may then eventually write them (indeed may halt after finding them!) Thus,
both z, s < ζ . But then we have that the universal machineU has started looping before time ζ , but this is absurd as then
we should have that the eventually writable ordinals all have codes in the smaller Lz — and this cannot happen as Lζ is a
union of admissible sets. 
In the sequel we shall only refer to snapshot sequences for the universal machine U so for brevity we shall drop the
superscript on SU(ζ ) etc.
Definition 24 ([31, Def. 2.11]). We define 0˜ =df {e ∈ ω | ∃yPe(0) ↑ y}.
The object 0˜ is thus a jump operator, which codes indices of all programs of eventually stable output (we include all
halted programs as also being of stable output). For the universal machineU by inspecting the ‘tapes’ of the programs Pe(0)
we can consider it calculating, we may ‘read off’ by inspecting certain cell values in S(ζ )which indices are in 0˜ and we have
that 0˜ is thus (1–1) reducible to S(ζ ). The converse is also true: given any cell Ci whose value we are interested in during
the computation of the universal machineU, we may write two programs Pe(i), Pe(i)′ to flash its 0 value to the output tape
of Pe(i) when it changes (or to Pe(i)′ when the value becomes 1). We can thus read that value eventual value (if it exists) off
from 0˜. We can then conclude that 0˜ and S(ζ ) are recursively isomorphic. We thus shall have:
Lemma 25. We have 0˜ ≡1 S(ζ ).
Lemma 26 ([32, Corollary 3.1]). Suppose ∃yPe(0) ↑ y. Then the least δ so that ∀δ′ > δ(y is on the output tape of Pe(0)) is less
than ζ .
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Proof. This is really a corollary to (the argument of) Lemma 22: one writes a code for the least δ = δ(σ (ν)) so that the
whole of a simulated run of Pe(0) along σ(ν) in the interval [δ, σ (ν)) has constant output tape. The argument concludes
that such a δ is eventually writable, thus is less than ζ . 
Lemma 27. If y is eventually writable then y ≤T S(ζ ).
Proof. The last lemma shows that y is on a recursive slice of the universal machine’s output tape which is devoted to
simulating the computation of Pe(0), and it is there by stage ζ . Information as to the values y(k) can be read off from S(ζ )
in an (ordinary Turing) recursive fashion. 
Lemma 28 ([32, Corollary 3.4]). The set H(Σ) is not admissible: there is aΣ1(H(Σ)) definable (in the parameter S(ζ )) function
g : ω −→ Σ which is cofinal.
Proof. Note that we have seen that H(Σ) = LΣ (Fact 21). Let
E =df {i ∈ ω | ∃δ∀β ∈ (δ, ζ ) CUi (β) = CUi (β + 1)}.
It is easy to see that E is recursive in S(ζ ): we let the universal machine itself be simulated by some program Pk writing
down cell values from that simulation on a recursive slice of its scratch tape. Those that settle down provide us with a
(recursive copy of) E, and this we can read off, again recursively, from S(ζ ).
For i /∈ E let Fi =df {β ∈ (ζ ,Σ) | CUi (β) 6= CUi (β + 1)}; then each Fi is a ∆1(LΣ )-definable class unbounded in Σ .
Straightforwardly by its definition, α −→ S(α) is a Σ1 function defined over LΣ . If LΣ were admissible, a simple closure
argument would provide a τ < Σ which is a common limit point of each of the Fi. This goes as follows. We may define by a
Σ1-recursion the function g defined by
• g(0) = ζ ,
• g(k+ 1) =df the least γ > g(k) so that ∀i < k(i /∈ E −→ Fi is unbounded in γ ).
That g is Σ1 definable over LΣ from ζ is easily checked, and moreover is defined on all of N. If LΣ were admissible its
range would be bounded in Σ . If τ = sup(ran(g)) this would mean S(τ ) = S(ζ ) contradicting the minimality of Σ in
Lemma 23(ii). 
Corollary 29. Every u ∈ H(Σ) is of the form Pe(S(ζ )) ↓ u for some e ∈ ω.
Proof. Suppose a code for u appears on Pf (0) at time β . Suppose β < g(n) (where g(n) is taken from the last lemma). Note
that g(n) isΣ1(H(Σ)) from the snapshot S(ζ ). Given S(ζ ) then by computing grand sums belowΣ as usual we may search
along σ(ν) < Σ running a program Pe(n)(S(ζ )) to search for a code for the g(n). Suppose this code is y ∈ WO. If now b is
the integer in the field of y coding that part of the ordering of order type β , we may then find a code for u by looking at the
universal course of computation for Pf (0) at the y  b ∼= β ’th ordinal place. The overall computation may then halt with this
code. 
Note that there will be many snapshots S(ζ ′) from which a given u can be computed. Indeed, for any u ∈ Lζ it can be
shown that the least ζ ′ for which this can be done is less than ζ .
We now prove the principal theorem of this section. It relates the pair of ordinal suprema of two of the kinds of ordinal
the ITTM universal machine can produce: the eventually writable which have supremum ζ and the accidentally writable
which have supremumΣ . The theorem appeared first in [31], but we give a clean presentation here, which we can use for a
machine–theoretic proof of the Friedman–Harrington theorem (Theorem 46) to follow. The import of Theorem 30 (and why
we are taking the trouble to reprove it here) is that it is the clear that all the corollaries, and most of the answers to the
questions raised earlier can now be seen to follow from it. Previously the questions were answered in a somewhat more
piecemeal fashion over several papers. We now can see that, for example, that the ‘‘Clockables are writables’’ Theorem (that
γ = λ) from [32], is actually a corollary to it. Moreover, the Normal Form Theorem again becomes a corollary to it. We thus
unify the results under one umbrella. The theorem is an equivalence between two notions defined in completely different
ways: ordinals appearing on the ‘‘tapes’’ of a computational model involving transfinitely many stages in time, on the one
hand, and on the other, the first pair of ordinals appearing at an appropriate level of definability of Gödel’s hierarchy of
constructible sets, with which he proved the consistency of the Axiom of Choice and the Continuum Hypothesis.
We could have put this and the next Theorem 46 together and have a three way equivalence, but choose not to cloud
the main event. Theorem 46 is the first example whereby a result proper to set theory is proven (admittedly not for the first
time) by appeal to an (admittedly infinitary)model of computation.
Theorem 30 ([32, 2.1]). The pair (ζ ,Σ) as defined above from ITTM’s, is also the lexicographically least pair satisfying either of
the following conditions:
(i) (ζ ,Σ) is a pair of ‘final repeat ordinals’ where (a) the snapshot S(ζ ) at time ζ of the universal machineU equals S(Σ), the
snapshot at timeΣ , and (b) S(ζ ) then reappears for ever with periodicityΣ ;
(ii) Lζ ≺Σ2 LΣ ;
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Proof. That (ζ ,Σ) satisfy (i) has been shown at Lemma 23. We first show that (ζ ,Σ) satisfy (ii). Suppose
(2) LΣ  ϕ(ξ) ≡ ∃u∀vψ(u, v, ξ)
whereψ isΣ0, and as an eventually writable parameter sequence we take the single ordinal ξ < ζ . Let u0 ∈ LΣ be such
that
(3) LΣ  ∀vψ(u0, v, ξ).
For e a program index, write ‘‘Pe(0)≤τu’’ to abbreviate ‘‘ u appears on Pe(0)’s computation tape at some time before or at
time τ ’’. Make also the obvious definition replacing ‘‘≤ τ ’’ with ‘‘< τ ’’. Let e0 be a program index so that Pe0(0)<Σu0. Let e1
be an index which ‘‘eventually writes’’ a code for ξ . The following claim proves (ii).
Claim 30.1. There is u ∈ Lζ satisfying Lζ  ∀ψ(u, v, ξ).
Proof of Claim 30.1. By Corollary 29 there exists e so that Pe(S(ζ )) ↓ u0. Thus,
(4) LΣ  ∃u(Pe(S(ζ )) ↓ u ∧ ∀vψ(u, v, ξ)).
(5) If ζ ′ < ζ ∧ Pg(S(ζ ′)) ↓<Σ then Pg(S(ζ ′)) ↓<ζ .
[Proof of (5): let ζ ′, g be as in the antecedent.Wemay find a program Ph that (i): using grand sumordinalsσ(ν) eventually
writes down a code for the snapshot S(ζ ′) and (ii): letting at time ν the approximation to S(ζ ′) currently available be S(ζ ′)ν ,
it writes down, if possible, a halting time αν ≤ σ(ν) for a simulation Pg(S(ζ ′)ν) along σ(ν). This will be possible, if the latter
converges before σ(ν). In this manner, if Pg(S(ζ ′)ν) ↓α , then we see that αν is eventually α, and α is thus less than ζ .]
Thus, if ζ ′ < ζ is assumed to satisfy (4) and Pe(S(ζ ′)) ↓ u1 then we shall have u1 ∈ Lζ and LΣ  ∀ψ(u1, v, ξ)) and then
byΠ1 reflection, that Lζ  ∀ψ(u1, v, ξ)) and we’d have:
(6) Lζ  ∃u(Pe(S(ζ ′)) ↓ u ∧ ∀vψ(u, v, ξ)).
We should then be finished with Claim 30.1.
We thus only need to show that there is such a ζ ′ < ζ satisfying (4). So we devise along by now familiar ways, a
computation that eventually writes the least such ζ ′ satisfying (4), thus ensuring it is less than ζ .
Let Pk(0) be the program that: (i) incorporates a program Pf (0)which eventually computes on its output tape a code for
ξ ; we set ξν for the value on this incorporated output tape at time ν; (ii) computes grand sum ordinals σ(ν) and searches
Lσ(ν) for the least ζ ′ such that
(7) Lσ(ν)  Pe(S(ζ ′))↓ u′ ∧ ∀vψ(u′, v, ξν))
and writes a code for such a ζ ′ (if it exists) to a reserved area R1 of the output tape; again it only does this latter step after
first checking that the new ζ ′ is greater than the current ordinal coded into R1. We know (by Lemma 26) that once σ(ν) is
sufficiently large below ζ then ξν = ξ holds; we also know that once it is sufficiently large, above some ordinal τ say, which
satisfies Pe(S(ζ )) ↓<τ u0, that it certainly can write down an ordinal ζ ′ ≤ ζ , so the process is not vacuous. We claim the
only ordinals written in this process to R1 are less than ζ .
Suppose once σ(ν) is above τ , that ζ ′ = ζ is the ordinal written. By definition of Pk ζ is never overwritten as u0 is a good
witness. But this makes ζ ∈ EW! Contradiction! So ζ ′ < ζ is written. However then applying (5) to Pe, (7) is aΠ1 sentence
about u′, ζ ′, ξν = ξ in Lζ , which reflects to Lζ .  (Claim 30.1)
We have thus shown:
Claim 30.2. Lζ ≺Σ2 LΣ .
Claim 30.3. (ζ ,Σ) is the least pair satisfying Lζ ≺Σ2 LΣ .
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that (z, s) <lex (ζ ,Σ) also satisfied Lz ≺Σ2 Ls. However, note by consideration of the
universal machine U running inside Ls, that Lz ≺Σ2 Ls alone implies that firstly that S(z) = S(s), and secondly that U
is actually entering a final loop at time z — which will repeat at time s, again as part of a permanent cycle and thus both
constraints (a) and (b) of (i) would also be satisfied. We show this more formally, letting Ci = CUi etc. :
Subclaim 30.4. If Ci(z) = 1 then for no ν ∈ (z, s) will we have Ci(ν) 6= Ci(ν + 1).
Proof of Subclaim 30.4. Let D = {ν < s |Ci(ν) 6= Ci(ν + 1)}, and let δi(z) < z be the point where cell Ci stabilized below
z (δi(z) exists since Ci(z) = 1). If Ls ‘‘∃ν(Ci(ν) 6= Ci(ν + 1) ∧ ν > δi(z)’’ this would go down to Lz by Σ1-reflection,
contradicting the definition of δ(z).  (Subclaim 30.4)
P.D. Welch / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 426–442 435
The point of the subclaim is that although we have S(z) = S(s) we have to again justify that the U has really finally
entered a looping cycle and no cell which has value 1 at time z will at some later time have value 0, in other words that
constraint (b) of (i) holds. Having established that, we have from Lemma 23(ii) that (z, s)must be (ζ ,Σ). 
We shall add another characterisation to the pair (ζ ,Σ)when we give a machine–theoretic proof Theorem 46. We now
can note:
Lemma 31. (a) The set H(ζ ) = Lζ isΣ2-admissible (and is a limit of such), and (b) the set H(Σ) = LΣ is a union of admissibles
(in factΣ2-admissibles).
Proof. (a) is proven by standardmethods:Σ2-admissibility requires closure under∆2 Comprehension andΣ2 replacement
schemes, and theΣ2-extendibility of Lζ gives us (more than) this. (b) is a simple application ofΣ2-extendibility of Lζ . 
It can be shown that (ζ ,Σ) is the lexicographically least pair such that for the universal machineU, S(ζ ) = S(Σ), using
the ‘‘Theory Machine’’ of [9]. There a very explicit calculation is made as to the points of occurrence of codes of Lα levels and
theirΣ2-truth sets, for α < Σ .
We mention some further results that can be obtained from the above. By an addition to Theorem 30 we obtain:
Corollary 32 (The λ-ζ-Σ-Theorem). Lλ ≺Σ1 Lζ ≺Σ2 LΣ .
Proof. The new part here is theΣ1-elementarity of H(λ) = Lλ in H(ζ ). But if Lζ  ∃uϕ(u, ξ)where ξ < λ, then we run an
algorithm that halts after it finds at some point an α with ξ < α < ζ for which there is such a u ∈ Lα and then halts with
an output code for Lα . Hence, Lα ∈ Lλ and thus Lλ  ∃uϕ(u, ξ). 
It is routine to obtain from this that Lλ is admissible.
Corollary 33 (‘‘All Clockables are Writables’’). γ =df sup{α | ∃e ∈ ωPe(0) halts in exactly α steps } = λ. That is, the writable
ordinals are unbounded in the ‘‘clockable’’ ordinals of [10, Section 3].
Proof. If Pe(0) halts in time α then this is a Σ1-statement true in LΣ . By the last corollary it is true in Lλ. Hence, γ ≤ λ.
However, γ is easily seen to be no less than λ, since if (a code for) λ′ < λ is the output of Pf (0) , then we may follow Pf (0)
by the algorithm that checks through the code for λ′ for wellfoundedness; this takes at least λ′ steps before halting. Hence,
there is a clockable ordinal≥ λ′. 
Corollary 34. The ITTM decidable sets of integers x ⊆ N are precisely those sets x ∈ P (N) ∩ Lλ.
Proof. If x ⊆ N is ITTMdecidable, using some procedure Pe then the queries ?Pe(n) ↓ 1?will all be decided by a computation
of the universal machineU by time ζ . The statement ‘‘∃y(y codes a halting course of computation witnessing Pe(n) ↓ 1)’’
is a Σ1 statement in the language of set theory, and by the λ-ζ -Σ-Theorem, if true in LΣ is true in Lλ by Σ1-elementarity.
Hence, the set x = {n ∈ N | Pe(n) ↓ 1} is a setΣ1 definable over Lλ. Since {n ∈ N|Pe(n) ↓ j ∧ j 6= 1} is alsoΣ1(Lλ)we have
that x ∈ ∆1(Lλ) and by admissibility of Lλ, x ∈ Lλ. Conversely, if x ∈ Lλ we may set an ITTM machine running to produce a
code for the set A = Lα where α is least with x ∈ Lα . We may then adjust this machine’s program to output all of x and a
fortiori x is seen to be decidable. 
The following is an analogue of Kleene’s Normal Theorem involving the T -predicate which, in the (standard) Turing case,
gives integer codes for halting computations sequences. This classical theorem due to Kleene gives integer codes y (using
prime power coding or some such) for a course of computation Pe(n) as ‘‘inputs’’ to a universal T predicate T1(e, n, y). (Here
the output of Pe(n) would be coded into the last element of the sequence that is coded by y.) For us we have similarly a
universal predicate, indeed we have the universal machine alluded to above, and this machine may simulate all Pe(n) for all
e and n at once. We have to have a real now to code the whole course of computation that is naturally transfinite in general.
This real y codes snapshots of each stage of the computation. Without knowing that every halting computation halts before
λ one would not be in a position to know that we could find for each e an index of a program that yields as halting outputs
a code of the whole computation sequence — essentially a sequence of snapshots S(τ ) for τ less than the length of the
computation ϕe(n).
We thus need to have for each length of a halting computation awritable real of that length alongwhichwe encode these
snapshots. That is what the last corollary provides.
The effectivity in the Normal Form Theorem of the transition e −→ e′ is obtained merely by observing that if we are
interested in program Pe then the following algorithm P ′e works. ‘‘Watch the universal machine’s simulation of all programs
Pf . Given n some program Pf (n)will halt with output some real y′ coding a wellorder of length longer than it takes for Pe(n)
to halt; now build a code for the course of computation Pe(n) ↓ utilising the ordering y′ to form y. When this code y is
complete with a final stage snapshot of the halting position of Pe(n), then halt’’.
The algorithm sketched in quotation marks is then capable of being put into ITTM terms and is thus our Pe′ . Although
we have not given a complete numerical blow-by-blow description of the algorithm, it should be enough to see that we
have something in close analogy to Kleene’s T1. If e is the e’th standard Turing computable function, Kleene shows us that
{e}(n) ↓↔ ∃y ∈ N T1(e, n, y). In the ITTM setting we see this is also essentially obtained by considering ‘‘universal’’
processes or machines, just as we are doing here. The universal machine U provides a ‘‘universal ITTM T predicate’’, T1
say, so that we have Pe(n) ↓↔ ∃y ∈ 2N T1(e, n, y). The above does not show the fact we establish below in the next Section
at Corollary 49 that we can provide tight bounds on the times needed to produce a code y. However, the above reasoning
establishes the following.
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Corollary 35 (Normal Form Theorem I). For any ITTM computable function ϕe we can effectively find another ITTM computable
function ϕe′ so that on any input n from ω if ϕe(n) ↓ then ϕe′(n) ↓ y ∈ 2N, where y codes a wellordered computation sequence
for ϕe(n).
If the reader lets us informally define (without going into all the details) Last(y) = z iff y codes a halting course of
computation with the last output tape containing z ∈ 2N, we may summarise the above discussion.
Corollary 36 (Normal Form Theorem I contd.). There is an ITTM decidable predicate T1 so that ∀e∀n:
Pe(n) ↓ z ↔ ∃y ∈ 2N[T1(e, n, y) ∧ Last(y) = z].
There is a higher type version obtained by relativising all the results (now for λx, ζ x, etc.) above to real number inputs:
Corollary 37 (Normal Form Theorem II). (a) For any ITTM computable function ϕe we can effectively find another ITTM
computable function ϕe′ so that on any input x from 2N if ϕe(x) ↓ then ϕe′(x) ↓ y ∈ 2N, where y codes a wellordered computation
sequence for ϕe(x). (b) The universal predicate T1 satisfies ∀e∀x:
Pe(x) ↓ z ↔ ∃y ∈ 2N[T1(e, x, y) ∧ Last(y) = z].
The effectivity is again established in the same way, noting that the input (whether n ∈ N or x ∈ 2N) does not affect the
above description of an algorithm in any dynamic way.
Although this is not necessary for what follows, we may relate some of the above to the Σ2-mastercode of Lζ this is a
constructible theoretic notion (see [4]). This is a set coding the whole of the structure Lζ ; however in this arena it essentially
can be taken to be the set T 2ζ , theΣ2-truth set. We define these theories in generality as follows.
Definition 38. For n < ω ≤ α, let T nα =df {pϕq | Lα  ϕ & ϕ is aΣn sentence ofL}.
Then T 2ζ is recursively isomorphic to those ITTM indices that index halting or eventually stable computations on zero input
— this is the set 0˜ defined above. Let A = A2ζ be thatΣ2-mastercode of Lζ . (The reader to whom the notion of mastercode is
unfamiliar, may simply drop the ‘‘A’’ from the following.)
Theorem 39 (cf. [31, Theorem 2.6]). We have 0˜ ≡1 A ≡1 T 2ζ .
There are also intimate connections between the jump operator derived from the halting problem for ITTM’s. Hamkins
and Lewis define:
Definition 40 ([10, Section 5]). Let x ∈ 2N. Then xO =df {e|Pe(x) ↓}.
Theorem 41. (i) The set xO is recursively isomorphic to theΣ1-theory of Lλx [x]. In particular 0O is recursively isomorphic to the
Σ1-theory of Lλ. [31, Thm 1.7]
(ii) The assignment x λx satisfies Spector’s Criterion:
x ≤∞ y −→ (xO ≤∞ y←→ λx < λy)
where x ≤∞ y⇐⇒ ∃e ∈ N(Pe(y) ↓ x). [31, Thm 1.5].
One could compare the above with the analogous result that Kleene’s O is recursively isomorphic to theΣ1-truth set of
Lωck1 (the latter is the level of the Gödel constructible hierarchy indexed by the least non-recursive ordinal). Given that the
relation x ≤∞ y defined in the last theorem is ∆12 one sees that we have here a degree notion on sets of integers that is
intermediate between hyperarithmetic, or∆11, and∆
1
2. A completely precise characterization awaits.
The notion of ≤∞ reducibility is a very natural one, when thinking of a machine model. However, the nature of the
machines is determined by the limit rule specification: and that is aΣ2-notion (cell Ci’s values are 0 at a limit stage unless
∃ν∀ν ′ > ν(Ci(ν ′) = 1).) The ultimate behaviour of such machines is tied in, as we have seen, with the looping behaviour of
the universal machineU and the ordinals ζ ,Σ; and here theΣ2 nature of the machinery is apparent. We may thus define
a notion of relative computability not by when a machine haltswith some t on its output tape, but by what it eventually has
on its output tape (if anything). There is thus a central notion of x is eventually computable in y:
Definition 42 ([31, 2.10]). (i) We set x ≤∞ y iff for some index ewe have Pe(y) ↑ x. In other words:
x ≤∞ y⇐⇒df ∃e ∈ N(Pe(y) ↑ x);
(ii) we define the concomitant notion of jump by:
x˜ =df {e ∈ N | Pe(x) ↑}
[31, 2.11].
P.D. Welch / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 426–442 437
There is an argument to be made that this reducibility, and notion of relative computability should be the fundamental
notion of ITTM computability. We have seen that we can obtain the results on clockable ordinals, and on what are the
decidable sets of integers, etc. only after settling all theΣ2 questions concerning repeating snapshots etc. Further note that
the universal machineU on 0 input is constructing the whole of the L hierarchy permanently up to ζ (and somewhat more
ephemerally, up to LΣ ). There are natural Spector classes (see [23, 4C]) associated with this notion of computation and [10,
7.3] demonstrates the existence of that associatedwith the notion of semi-decidable; similar arguments show that themuch
larger Spector Class is intimately associated with ‘‘eventually semi-decidable’’ sets of reals, and is available from the ITTM
architecture. These concepts are discussed further in [34]. As the ordinary degree structure ≤∞ turns out not to be much
like Turing degrees, but more like hyperdegrees, there is less psychological need to stick with halting computations, as with
stable computations — and then we regard ‘halting’ as a particularly stable kind of stability!
If we make this decision then ITTM definable sets can then be related to the notion of arithmetically quasi-inductive [2]
which we have mentioned in the introduction. Again the relation x ≤∞ y is∆12. We then have:
Theorem 43. (i) The set x˜ is recursively isomorphic to the Σ2-theory of Lζ x [x]. In particular 0˜ is recursively isomorphic to the
Σ2-theory of Lζ [31, 2.13].
(ii) The assignment x ζ x satisfies Spector’s Criterion:
x ≤∞ y −→ (˜x ≤∞ y←→ ζ x < ζ y).
[31, 2.12]
Along these lines, Klev has defined in [19] an extension of Kleene’s O to an O++, that mirrors exactly Kleene’s original
definition as a tree (indeed the tree is literally an extension of Kleene’s), and is to the complete Σ2(Lζ ) set what O is to
Σ1(Lωck1 ).
The relevant definition and the L-hierarchy equivalent formulation at the higher type run as follows:
Definition 44. Let A, B ⊆ 2N. Then A ≤∞ B iff there is some program index e ∈ ω, and some y ∈ 2N, so that we have:
∀x ∈ 2N[x ∈ A↔ Py,Be (x) ↑ 1 ∧ x /∈ A↔ Py,Be (x) ↑ 0.
Theorem 45. Let A, B ⊆ 2N. Then A ≤∞ B iff for some pair of Σ2 formulae ϕ0, ϕ1 ∈ L∈˙,x˙,y˙B˙, for some y ∈ 2N, we have for any
x ∈ 2N:
x ∈ A↔ Lζ x,y,B [x, y, B]  ϕ0[x, y, B]
and
x /∈ A↔ Lζ x,y,B [x, y, B]  ϕ1[x, y, B]
where we set ζ x,y,B to be least ζ so that there is some leastΣ > ζ with Lζ [x, y, B] ≺Σ2 LΣ [x, y, B].
W. Richter asked (communication with Friedman and Harrington) whether, for any 2 ≤ n, the lexicographically least pair
of ordinals (ζ n,Σn)with T nζ n = T nΣn was the lexicographically least pair satisfying: Lz ≺Σn Ls. This was positively answered,
independently by L. Harrington and by S-D. Friedman.
Theorem 46 (Friedman [8], Harrington (Unpublished)). Let n ≥ 2. If (z, s) is the lexicographically least pair satisfying T nz = T ns
then Lz ≺Σn Ls.
For n = 2 this question arises naturally in ITTM theory, and adds another characterisation to Theorem 30.
Lemma 47. If (z, s) is the least pair satisfying T 2z = T 2s then (z, s) = (ζ ,Σ) and hence Lz ≺Σ2 Ls.
Proof. We use the notation of Theorem 30. For a contradiction suppose that (z, s) <lex (ζ ,Σ) satisfied T 2z = T 2s . Again we
see that S(z) = S(s) as these snapshots are coded into the Σ2-theories. Just as in Claim 30.3 these cannot be snapshots of
the final looping sequence of U. So for some i and D defined as in the subclaim of this Claim 3 there, δ =df sup(D) < s
and ‘‘d = δ’’ is aΠ1 definable relation over Ls. Note that Lδ+1 ‘‘δ is countable’’ (otherwise, Lδ+1 ‘‘δ is a cardinal’’ but then
we should have many pairs u < v < d with Lu ≺ Lv). Hence, every ordinal δ′ < δ is ∆1(Lδ+1) definable from δ (via the
usual L-least map ofω onto the countable ordinal δ, which is again definable over Lδ). But then we have a parameter freeΠ2
definition of T 2s over Ls as follows:
pϕq ∈ T 2s ⇐⇒
∀d[d = δ −→ Ld+1  ‘‘pϕq ∈ T 2f (k) where f : ω  Ld is the <L −least onto map’’]
and k is such that f (k) = z. But theΣ2-theory of Lδ (which isΣ Lδ2 ) does not have as well aΠ2 parameter free definition over
Ls which the above provides. So this is a contradiction. As T 2Σ clearly equals T
2
ζ , we obtain the desired result.  (Theorem
50)
Having thus set out the basic fundamentals of the theory we turn to two sets of problems which are left unanswered by
the above.
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3. Halting and writing times
In this section we address two issues: once a machine computing, say Pe(0), has stopped, how quickly could we produce
a code for that course of computation? If for example the machine halts after α steps, the Normal Form Theorem tells us
that there is a y, a code for that course of computation, but gives no information as to where/when/how to find it. In order to
produce such a y, onemust first start out by producing a code forα itself. Once that is done, one can run another computation
that takes the given code for α and simulates along the ordering coded the original course of computation of Pe(0) ↓. For a
machine to build a course of computation it must have the materials consisting of an ordering along which to work (and the
original instructions embodied in Pe of course).
The first theorem below says that in fact we can compute a code for α extremely fast: in fact there is another program
that will do it in α steps at worst.
The second issue is whether the gaps in the clockable ordinals noted by Hamkins and Lewis ([10, Gap Existence Theorem
3.4]) are all initiated at stages in time which correspond to admissible ordinals. (They had noted that admissible ordinals
can start gaps, since they had shown that no admissible ordinal can be the precise length of any halting computation.) We
show here that gapsmust be started by admissible ordinals.
3.1. Quick writing
We prove here a result which we have announced, and has been used in the literature, (see [3]), but whose proof has not
yet appeared. It concerns quick writing: if a program halts after α many steps, how soon can a machine produce a code for
α? That it can produce a code is the ‘‘Clockables are Writables’’ theorem (Corollary 33). But how quickly? We previously had
announced a slightly weaker result that required α + ωmany steps to write α. We observe here that it can be done in≤ α
steps.
Lemma 48. Suppose e is such that Pe(0) ↓ in exactly α ≥ ω steps. Then there is f such that Pf (0) ↓ y in ≤ α steps with
y ∈ WO∧‖y‖ = α.
Proof. If Pe(0) ↓ in exactly α steps then α is inadmissible (by [10, Thm 8.8]). Set γ =df the largest admissible, or limit
of admissibles, ≤ α. We split into cases: although these could all be absorbed into Case 3, the other arguments are not
unilluminating.
Case 1. γ = α. Then α is a limit of admissibles. The program Pe(0) is halting at the limit time α because it is viewing a
particular configurations of 0, 1’s in the three cells C0(α), C1(α), C2(α) (recall that the read/write head views three cells on
each of the tapes at the same time); at time α it is in the limit state qL and due to a line on its transition table, immediately
goes next into a halting state because of the configuration it sees. Let the triplet 〈C0(α), C1(α), C2(α)〉 be 〈k0, k1, k2〉. Then
not all of the kj are 1: if so therewould be some previous limit stageα′ < α atwhich the r/w headwould be viewing precisely
this configuration and it would have halted earlier. So at least one of the kj is a 0. We could now divide into subcases as to
which particular combinations of these three cells contains 0’s; but let us just pretend it is the cell C0(α) that has value 0 at
this limit stage, and it is this appearance of a 0 at this limit point in time alone that causes the machine to halt. It therefore
cannot be that C0 contained a 0 at any previous limit time:we conclude that there is only a 0 at timeα because there has been
a strictly increasing sequence of stages βn+1 for n < ωwith C0(βn+1) = 0 6= C0(βn+2). Perforce sup{βn+1|n < ω} = α,
(otherwise, again, there would have been an earlier halt). We now run the universal machineU, and look for grand sums of
ordinals σ(ν) for ν < α along the way. By admissibility, ν < α −→ σ(ν) < α (as we can think of running the machines
inside Lα). We devise a modification to this program that (i) simulates the original Pe(0), and (ii) that for the first time it
sees an ordinal γ0 + 1 with (a) C0(γ0 + 1) = 0 6= C0(γ0 + 2) and (b) C1(γ0 + 1) = 1 = C2(γ0 + 1) it writes a code for γ0
to a reserved area of tape R again. At a later time when a larger γ1 is found satisfying (a) and (b), it first checks: (c) that the
values C1(γ ′), C2(γ ′) have been constantly 1 in the interval [C1(γ0 + 1, γ1 + 1) (if this fails she must scrap the contents of
R setting it to 0’s), she then ‘‘adds’’ the codes for the wellordering γ1 to the ordinal code in R (this takes at most ω steps) to
obtain (if in this case (c) did not fail), γ0+γ1. We can organise these additions in a continuousway (as we know that we shall
have exactly order type ω many successful lengthenings of these wellorderings), so that continuing in this fashion at stage
α it will have a code for the unbounded sum of the ordinals βn in the area R; this will take as many steps as the calculation
of Pe(0), namely α. When the simulated Pe(0) halts, so does this program. A code for α in this case is then computable in
precisely α steps.
Case 2. γ < α < γ + ω. Hamkins and Lewis (in the ‘Speed-Up Lemma’) [10, Lemma 3.3] show in general that if δ + n is
clockable then so is δ. Hence, there is e′ so that Pe′(0) halts in exactly γ steps. It suffices to write a code for γ in the manner
of Case 1, with k further points added on the end, where α = γ + k for some k < ω. This can be done (providing we write
the kmany extra points first!), as we have seen, in γ many steps.
Case 3. γ < γ +ω ≤ α. We consider the following algorithm Ph for computing truth sets of structures 〈Lδ,∈〉. Ph effects the
following:
(i) SimulatesU the universal ITTM;
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(ii) Looks onU’s ‘‘tape’’ for codes of wellfounded models of the form Lβ , for increasing β:
(iii) When it finds an Lβ it writes T 2β , theΣ2-truth set for Lβ to a reserved part R1, of its scratch tape; it does this by writing
a 0 in cell Ci if the Gödel number of the i’thΣ2 sentence is in T 2β , and 1 otherwise.
(iv) When (iii) is done, we require it to flash a Flag cell ‘‘1, 0, 1’’; then it goes back to (ii) to look for a larger Lβ ′ to repeat the
process, and overwrite T 2β with its new values T
2
β ′ .
Each time it cycles through (ii)–(iv) the flag is flashed. The result being that at some limit stage with the flag at ‘0’, we
know we have some Tβ∗ on the scratch tape, for β∗ = supn βn where all T 2βn have previously appeared on the scratch tape.
Note that this ‘‘eventual theory’’ Tβ∗ ⊇ T 2β∗ , but in general will not be equal. (We are obliged to Sy Friedman for pointing out
that we had not taken care of this in our previous proof.) SomeΣ2 sentencemay be true for arbitrarily large γ ′ < γ without
being true at γ .
Herewe appeal instead to Lemma1of [9]:which shows that theΣ2 theory of Lβ∗ , T 2β∗ , is then uniformly (inβ
∗) recursively
enumerable in this ‘eventual theory’ Tβ∗ . From T 2β∗ we can define recursively a real coding a wellorder of length β
∗. This
gives us a new, larger, ordinal to work on, and the algorithm at (iv), when it returns to (ii) can continue. In short we have a
procedure which over any admissible Lδ is aΣ1-definable: if on the η’th time we loop around this process the theory T 2η∗ is
obtained, then η→ η∗ is an increasing functionΣ1 definable over any admissible Lδ where it will define a function δ→ δ.
Moreover, at time δ it will have Tδ on R1.
As γ is a limit of admissibles, then at stage γ this process has written Tγ to R1. We now note that the next admissible
ordinal γ+ > γ is the least ordinal not recursive in Tγ , i.e.γ+ = ωTγ1ck = ω
T2γ
1ck. Asα ≥ γ+ω there is a subset,G ofω, recursive
in Tγ by some (standard) Turing reduction {g}Tγ for some g ∈ ω with G coding a wellorder of type α. However, now recall
that if B is any set on the scratch tape at time δ, then at time δ + ω we may arrange for B′′ to be written to the output tape.
As G ≤T Tγ we may similarly arrange instead for G to be written by time γ + ω ≤ α. To complete the Lemma we need to
observe that we can also get this algorithm to halt at exactly time α: this can be effected by running the original program
Pe(0) that halted in time α in parallel and simultaneously with the above. Since our ‘‘arrangement’’ described above will be
writing many different ‘‘G’’ as {g}Tδ for different δ ≤ γ we need to know when to stop. We thus run Pe(0) as a clock to tell
us. 
From this kind of thinking we may obtain some information extra concerning possible normal form course of
computations. The division into cases above can be overcome, if we allow ourselves some more steps to play with. We
can then find a bound on the times needed to produce codes in the Normal Form Theorem Corollary 35. We omit the details
of the proof.
Theorem 49. If ϕe is an ITTM computable function then we may effectively find an e′ ∈ ω satisfying the Normal Form Theorem
so that for any n ∈ ω if ϕe(n) ↓ in α steps (where α ≥ ω) then ϕe′(n) ↓ y in< ω2.(α + 2) steps.
Proof. We briefly sketch the argument which uses the ‘‘Theory Machine’’ of [9]. We use the Jα Jensen hierarchy for the
constructible sets (see [15] or [4]). If Pe(n) ↓α then by absoluteness of the machine construction (Pe(n) ↓α)Jα+1 , and there is
a course of computation code ywitnessing this with y ∈ Jα+1. With care one canwrote this out as a parameter free definition
of ywhich isΣ Jα+12 . However, the TheoryMachine continually produces codes for levels of the J-hierarchy togetherwith their
theories, on its output tape (without ever halting), and it turns out that this machine will have a real c = cα+1 on its output
tape at timeω2.(α+1)+ωwhich codes the structure Jα+1. Recursively in c then (using the index e to define the reduction),
we may define the code y. This takes another ω many steps, and we have a code for y written out in ω2.(α + 1) + ω + ω
many steps. 
There is a similar corollary for the Normal Form Theorem II, (Corollary 37), involving real number inputs xwhich is again
uniform in x. We leave this to the reader to formulate.
3.2. Only admissibles start gaps
We now show that only admissible ordinals start gaps. Previously it was known that many gaps were started by
admissible ordinals, and that no admissible was the length of any halting computation of the form Pe(n) ↓. The short
argument that follow shows that admissibility is required for this to happen. Thiswas announced (but unproven) as Theorem
17 in [34].
Theorem 50. If γ starts a gap in the clockable ordinals, then γ is admissible.
Proof of Theorem 50. We suppose this fails, and that γ0 starts a gap, but is inadmissible. By this supposition then:
Lγ0  ∀n ∈ ω∃αψ(n, α, ξ)
for someΣ1 ψ , some ordinal parameter ξ , where ψ is defining a function F : ω→ γ0 monotone cofinally. Note that γ0 is a
limit of clockable ordinals, (otherwise it could not be starting a gap in the clockables, but would be interior to one!) Hence,
ξ < ξ ′ < γ0 for some clockable ξ ′ and by applying Lemma 48 as above, there is a program index f ′ producing in ξ ′ steps a
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code for ξ ′ and by a trivial modification that writes down a suitable initial segment, an index f can be effectively found from
f ′ so that Pf (0)τ ↓ yξ ∈ WO∧||yξ || = ξ and τ ≤ ξ ′.
We consider the following algorithm P: it simulates Pf until this has converged. We have, by using a universal machine,
that there is a program index e0 ∈ ω so that ϕe0 continually computes (without ever halting) a code on its scratch area for
levels Lσ of the L-hierarchy, where σ is the (current) grand sum of all ordinals coded on all halted output computations as
simulated by the universal machine.
Once Pf has converged, we run Pe0 at the same time checking within the Lσ ’s constructed whether Lσ  ∃αψ(n, α, ξ)
for 0, 1, 2, . . . in strictly increasing order. It lists those n for which this holds to a piece of scratch tape, and flashes the
lead cell C0 1, 0, 1 each time a new n is added to the list (otherwise C0 is untouched). The machine Pe finally halts if
at any limit stage C0 contains a 0. But it is easy to check that this happens exactly at γ0. Hence, γ0 does not start a gap.
Contradiction!  (Theorem 50)
This finishes our results on the ‘‘standard models’’ of ITTM’s.
4. 3 tape and 1 tape limit halting times
We consider now the 1 tape model of [12]. Here, the 3 tape model is replaced with a single tape, and a read/write head
viewing just one single cell at a time. In all other respects the machinery, software, behaviour at limit times etc., is identical
to the 3 tape machine. It is shown that in [12] that the 1 tape machine is not exactly the same in its behaviour as the 3 tape
machine: the classes of computable functions on integers, or even function f : 2N −→ N are identical. However, there is
a difficulty of simulating 3 tape computations for functions f : 2N −→ 2N. One way around this difficulty is by allowing a
3-symbol alphabet. We outlined one method for this in [30], where we allowed a ‘B’ for a blank symbol as well as 0, 1, and
the B (for ambiguity) would be written at a limit stage λ in a cell that had changed value cofinally in λ. Such an arrangement
is also fully powerful as regards the 3 tape model. In [34] we discussed further the relationship of the 1 tape model to the 3
tapemodel, principally in terms of classifying what is on the tapes at limit ordinal stages. One advantage of the 1 tapemodel
is that one can get a definable pointclass of sets that is adequate (in the sense of Moschovakis [23] p.158). With a 3 tape
model, and the R/W head reading 3 cells simultaneously at the start position, one obtains classes one step up in a difference
hierarchywhich are not adequate. (Adequacy is desirable as it allows for parametrization and some closure properties to be
enjoyed). The paper [34] further classified descriptive set-theoretically pointclasses on 1 tape machines defined by halting
times. A very nice suggestion coming from work on ordinal length tape Turing machines (from Dawson and Koepke) is that
we do not place the R/W back on cell C0 at a limit time λ, but on the liminf of the cell positions up to time λ, and moreover
the machine state qi at time λ is the liminf of the machine states up to this time also. This very elegantly puts the current
‘instruction’ to be at the outermost loop of any subroutines that were being enacted up to time λ. This would probably alter
the nature of some of the results just mentioned.
The following Lemma holds for both the standard 0, 1 valued 3 tape and 1 tape models, for an enumeration of the cells
〈Ci | i < ω〉. It also holds for the 1 tape model using blanks mutatis mutandis. Roughly speaking the tape’s contents at a
reasonably closed ordinal time γ is Σ2 definable over Lγ ; after a further ω many steps of calculation we expect to get a
double (standard) Turing jump of that to be written to the tape. Hence,Σ4 definability of those cell values is in order here:
Lemma 51. In the language L{∈˙,x˙}, there are Σ4 formulae ϕ0(v0, v1), ϕ1(v0, v1), so that during any computation of the form
Pe(x), for any primitively closed ordinal γ : Cm(γ + ω) = i (i < 2) if and only if Lγ [x]  ϕi[x,m].
Proof. First assume only that γ is a limit stage in the computation of Pe(x). Let s0 be the ‘‘snapshot’’ at stage γ ; that is let
s0 code 〈Ci(γ )|i < ω〉. We note just as above that there is an (ordinary) Turing recursive total function F , so that if n < ω
‘‘F(s0  n) = u" iff u is a sequence of length n representing the cell sequence 〈Ci(γ +n)|i < n〉 after n stages of the operation
of Pe(x) beyond γ . Then
Claim 51.1. ‘‘F(v) = u’’ is∆1(Lω).
Now assume that γ is reasonably closed, for example, p.r. closed. Then
Claim 51.2. ‘‘Ci(α) = j’’ is∆Lγ [x]1 ({α}).
Claim 51.3. ‘‘u = s0  n" is (Σ2 ∨Π2)(Lγ [x]).
Proof of Claim 51.3. We exhibit a formula demonstrating this:
u = s0  n⇐⇒ Fun(u) ∧ dom(u) = n ∧ ranu ⊆ 2 ∪ B ∧ ∀i ∈ dom(u)
[(u(i) = j ∧ ∃γ < γ∀γ ′ > γ (γ ′ < γ −→ Ci(γ ′) = j) ∨
(u(i) = j = B ∧ ∀γ < γ ∃γ ′ > γ (γ ′ < γ ∧ Ci(γ ′) 6= Ci(γ ′ + 1))].  (Claim 51.3)
Claim 51.4. Cm(γ + ω) = i < 2⇐⇒∃k < ω∀l > k(∀u((u = s0  l) −→ (F(u))m = 1)).
The formula on the right hand side of Claim 51.4 yields our result. 
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Theorem 52. There is a limit ordinal γ +ωwhich is the halting time of a 3 tape machine computation of the form Pe(0) for some
e; but which is not the halting time of any 1 tape machine program.
Proof of Theorem 52. Let γ be least that is Π3-reflecting. Then γ is in fact an admissible limit of admissibles. (Any Π2
reflecting ordinal is admissible, and the admissibility axioms themselves allow aΠ3 axiomatisation.) We note for later that
Lγ has no proper Lα ≺Σ1 Lγ substructures (for that it would have to be much more thanΠn-reflecting for all n).
Claim 52.1. γ is 3 tape clockable.
Proof of Claim 52.1. By the minimality of γ , it is not Π4-reflecting, i.e. there is a sentence σ and a Π2 formula ψ(v0, v1)
so that σ ⇐⇒ ∀n∃mψ(n,m) is true at Lγ but at no earlier level. We may assume (as we have done) that without loss of
generality, the quantifiers in σ are natural number quantifiers (this again follows from the leastness assumptions on γ that
every x ∈ Lγ has a parameter freeΣ1 definition.)
We run the algorithm Pe above, of Case 3 of Lemma48whichwrites theory sets Tβ∗ to a scratch tape. By usingΠ2 reflection
the admissibility of γ ensures that T 2γ is indeed the tape’s contents at time γ .
We shall modify this procedure so that the resulting program halts at stage γ + ω. By the remark following the descrip-
tion of Pe (concerning p.r. closed ordinals, and the fact that admissibles are limits of such), we shall have that the Flag of Pe
at stage γ is a ‘0’. We’ll make the additional assumption that this Flag of Pe was in fact the cell C1. We assume also we have
left C0 free for our use now.We add the condition that whenever the Flag (i.e. C1) is 0, at a limit stage, which it recognises by
being in the limit state, ql, we change it to 1, and also ensure that C0 is 0 also; When additionally the Flag is ‘0’ at a limit (as
opposed to the flashing 1,0,1 at some successor stages in the above description of Pe) we then arrange to have inspected in
the next ωmany steps the currentΣ2-truth set which we can assume is present on the tape as described above. We set up
C0 so that it flashes 0, 1 each timewe find some 〈0, k0〉, 〈1, k1〉, . . . so that for some ki p¬ψ(i, ki)q is absent from this truth set.
Subclaim 52.2. At γ +ω we have C1 = 1, C0 = 0, and this is the first limit where this happens. Hence, we can modify Pe to halt
exactly at stage γ + ω when this happens.
[Straightforward.] (Claim 52.1)
Claim 52.3. The ordinal γ + ω is not 1 tape clockable.
Proof of Claim 52.3. Deny for a contradiction.
First suppose γ + ω was clockable via an algorithm that was programmed to halt when C0 contained a 1 and thus it did so
because ∃n∀m > n C0(γ + m) = 1. This is Σ4(Lγ ), and also by Π3-reflection must reflect down to some γ < γ . That is,
C0(γ + ω) = j. Contradiction! Hence, γ was clockable using an algorithm that halts on 0 and in which the contents of C0
altered cofinally in γ + ω. Thus, we must have for some 0 < n < ω ‘‘C0(γ + n) 6= C0(γ + n + 1)’’. This is ∆3(Lγ ) (see (3)
of the proof of Lemma 51). ByΠ3-reflection we shall have that C0(γ + n) 6= C0(γ + n+ 1) for unboundedly many γ < γ ′,
for some γ ′ < γ and the program would thus halt at such a γ ′.
For completeness we just additionally note:
Claim 52.4. The ordinal γ + ω + 1 is 1 tape clockable.
Proof. With the extra stepwe can run the argument of (1) and inspect the cell C1 and halt at the right point. (Theorem52)
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